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Introduction
In recent years, several academics as well as policy makers have pointed out that undesired incentive effects arising from the interplay between different social insurance programs within a welfare state may be an overlooked and financially costly phenomenon (see e.g. Krueger and Meyer 2002 , and the European Economic Advisory Group, 2007) . Many countries have complex social insurance systems and their various parts sometimes overlap in ways that can generate unintended flows between them. This has, for instance, been noted with regard to unemployment (UI) and sickness insurance (SI) in Sweden and Norway (see e.g. Larsson 2006, and Henningsen 2006) , UI and disability pensions in Sweden and Finland (see e.g. Karlström et al 2006, and OECD 2006) , and UI and workers' compensations programs in Canada (see e.g. Fortin and Lanoie 1992) . In the presence of such interactions, limiting access to one program may just result in an overflow to other programs. Reforms intended to increase transitions to employment by a change of a single program may then not be very effective. For example, reducing the amount or the duration of UI benefits may not be an efficient way of inducing the unemployed to search harder for jobs if they can easily shift to other benefit programs.
While there is evidence that the interplay between different social insurance programs sometimes does give rise to benefit arbitrage (see e.g. Larsson 2006, and Runeson 2007) , little research has been done on whether such interactions actually matter for transitions to employment. Pellizzari (2006) , who studies interactions between UI and social assistance in 15 EU countries, is an exception. His findings suggest that UI recipients who are also eligible for social assistance are less sensitive to changes in the level and the duration of their UI benefits, and that the interplay between these programs may provide an explanation for the scant success of many labor market reforms in Europe in the past decades. In this paper, I provide Swedish evidence on the interplay between UI and another type of social insurance program, namely the SI, and on whether this interplay affects transitions to employment.
In Sweden, unemployed individuals are able to report sick and receive SI benefits.
The rationale behind this rule is that job search is comparable to work. In order to be IFAU -Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment?eligible for UI, an unemployed person should actively search for jobs and be able to accept employment at short notice. A person who looses his or her work (search) capacity due to sickness should therefore be funded by the SI rather than the UI.
Previous research on the interplay between these two insurances, however, suggests that health deterioration is not the sole explanatory factor for transitions to the SI. The probability of transferring to the SI is affected by the relative compensation in the two systems; unemployed persons are more likely to report sick if their replacement rate is higher in the SI than in the UI (Larsson and Runeson 2007) . The probability of reporting sick is also found to increase drastically as the UI expiration date approaches, suggesting that the SI may be used as a way of postponing the UI expiration date (though it cannot be excluded that the peak is at least partly driven by health deterioration due to stress) (Larsson 2006, and SFU 2007) .
If transitions to employment would follow a similar trajectory regardless of shifting to the SI or remaining in the UI system, this type of interplay should perhaps not cause too much concern. Of course, government spending increases if the SI benefits are higher than the individual's alternative benefits, but the costs would be much larger if these UI-SI interactions in general also worked to prolong the individuals' time out of employment.
There are in fact several reasons for why the source of funding (UI or SI) may matter for the incentives to find work. Being on UI is associated with a number of rules, the purpose of which is to increase transitions to employment: the worker is obliged to apply for and accept jobs, otherwise a sanction may be imposed 1 ; benefits are reduced after 100 benefit days 2 ; and there is a formal time limit on how long benefits can be re- . SI benefits, on the other hand, are not associated with any similar requirements 1 Some recent empirical studies from the Netherlands and Switzerland suggest that imposing sanctions in the UI substantially raises the exit rate from unemployment, see e.g. Abbring et al (2005) and Lalive et al (2005) . 2 The question of how the UI benefit level affects job finding has received extensive attention in the economic literature. A recent survey of the evidence is provided by Krueger and Meyer (2002) . The US studies surveyed imply an elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the UI benefit level in excess of 0.5. The results from other countries are more varied. Carling et al (2001) suggest an elasticity of 1.6 for Sweden. 3 Several empirical studies find that the transition rate from unemployment to employment increases as the UI expiration date approaches. See e.g. Moffitt (1985) , Meyer (1990) , and Katz and Meyer (1990) for evidence from the US. Swedish evidence is reported by Carling et al (1996) .
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and have in principle unlimited duration.
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Hence, if the UI rules work as intended, funding from the UI rather than the SI could (for a given health status) be expected to be associated with a higher search effort.
In order to study whether transitions to SI among the unemployed affect the transition rate to employment, I use a reform in July 2003 which changed the relative compensation in the two systems. The reform reduced the SI benefit cap (i.e. the maximum amount) so as to correspond to the UI benefit cap, in order to prevent unemployed workers from receiving higher benefits by reporting sick. Before the reform, SI benefits could exceed UI benefits by up to 20 percent. Larsson and Runeson (2007) find that this policy change led to a large (36 percent) decline in the sick report rate among the unemployed affected by the reform. The question of interest here is whether the reduced sick report rate in turn translated into a higher rate of job finding.
To identify the effect of the reduced SI benefits (relative to the UI benefits) on the transition rate to employment, I use the fact that the reform affected various groups of unemployed persons differently and at different durations of unemployment. First, as workers became unemployed at different dates, the reform affected them at different lengths into their unemployment period. This variation can be used to separate the reform effect from the effect of unemployment duration. I do this by comparing the hazard to employment for people who experienced the reform at different stages of their unemployment period. Second, only those with previous wages above the UI benefit cap were affected by the reform. The change in transitions to employment for those with previously lower wages can thus be used to control for calendar time effects (such as business cycle effects) around the time of the reform, which were common to the two groups.
5
My results suggest that, while the reform significantly reduced sickness absence among the unemployed, this did not matter for the transition rate to employment. For those who reduced their sick report rate due to the reform, spending more time in the UI 4 These were the rules in place during the time period for which I have data in this paper. 5 Larsson and Runeson (2007) use a similar identification strategy.
IFAU -Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? 5 rather than the SI did not seem to shorten the time out of employment. This finding is robust across various sensitivity tests. Hence, while there are important interactions between these two social insurance systems, I find no evidence suggesting that these interactions affect the job finding rate among the unemployed workers.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 I describe the central features of Sweden's UI and SI systems, as well as the SI reform in July 2003. Section 3 discusses theoretical issues. The empirical strategy is described in Section 4, and Section 5 presents the data. The results as well as a number of sensitivity checks are shown in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
Unemployment and sickness insurance in Sweden
6
The UI and SI constitute essential parts of the public social insurance system in Sweden.
Their purpose is to insure against income losses due to involuntary unemployment (the UI) and sickness (the SI). Both insurances provide income-related compensation up to a cap and the benefits are for the most part financed by taxes.
2.1
Description of the unemployment insurance The UI consists of two parts: a basic insurance offering a fixed amount of compensation and a voluntary income-loss insurance providing income-related benefits. In order to be eligible for any kind of UI benefits, an unemployed person must be registered at the public employment service (PES) as a 'job seeker' and be willing to accept employment. Qualification for income-related benefits additionally requires that the person has been a member of a UI fund for at least twelve months prior to unemployment (the membership condition) and that he or she has worked during at least six of these months (the working condition). If the person fulfills the working condition but not the membership condition, he or she is entitled to the fixed basic amount of compensation.
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The UI is administered by a number UI funds that together enroll about 85 percent of the work force. The PES controls that the unemployed fulfill the rules concerning job search. To receive UI benefits, an unemployed person has to meet his or her caseworker at the PES regularly and apply for any job the caseworker assigns him or her. If the person does not meet these requirements, he or she can be submitted to a sanction in the form of reduced or suspended benefits. The sanctions can be time-limited or permanent, depending on if the person has broken the rules before, and on the expected length of the job he or she refuses to accept. 8 In 2003, when the reform was implemented, the UI benefits were time-limited to 300 workdays (60 weeks) and could be received either continuously or with breaks in the unemployment period. For individuals reaching the end of their benefit period, a PES caseworker would assess the need for intensified counseling. If such a need was found, the person would get assigned to a specific labor market program 9 . Refusing to participate would lead to benefit expiration. If intensified counseling was not found necessary, the unemployed would get entitled to a new benefit period of 300 days. Such an extension was however only possible once.
The UI replaced 80 percent of the worker's average earnings during the last six month of employment, with a lower and an upper limit. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
The lower limit was SEK 7,040 (≈ € 760) 10 per month and equaled the fixed basic amount. The maximum amount varied depending on how long the person had been unemployed. During the first 100 benefit days, the cap was 80 percent of a monthly wage of SEK 20,075 and after that the cap dropped to 80 percent of SEK 18,700. No compensation was given during the first five days of an unemployment period. 11 8 An unemployed person does not necessarily have to accept any job in order to receive further UI benefits. Factors such as the family situation and the duration of unemployment are taken into account in the judgement. 9 The program was called Activity Guarantee and implied full time activity. Participants were offered counselling and the whole spectrum of programs and services available at the PES. The economic compensation equaled the UI benefits. 10 Exchange rate May, 2007. 11 If the unemployment was voluntary, that is if the person had quit his or her job without a valid reason, the uncompensated period was up to 45 benefit days. For those who had been laid off because of improper behaviour, the suspension period could be even longer. 2.2 Description of the sickness insurance The SI provides economic compensation when a worker is too sick to carry out his or her regular job. All employed workers are automatically covered by the insurance. Unemployed workers who have previously been employed are also eligible, as long as they are registered as 'job seekers' at the PES. The size of the SI benefits depends on the person's wage prior to the sick period. For unemployed workers however, the benefits are based on the wage prior to unemployment.
The Social Insurance Agency is responsible for the SI compensation for unemployed workers. The first day of a sickness period is always uncompensated. During the first seven days it is up to the individual to judge whether he or she is too sick to work (search). Thereafter, the person needs a certificate from a doctor in order to receive additional benefits. In 2003, there was no formal time-limit for how long SI benefits could be received.
In the beginning of 2003, the SI replacement rate was 80 percent of the previous (pre-unemployment) wage. Hence, the replacement rate was the same as in the incomerelated UI.
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The minimum wage for receiving any SI benefits at all was SEK 775 per month, and the maximum SEK 24,125 per month. In other words, SI benefits varied 12 However, the two insurance systems define the earnings on which the benefits are based somewhat differently. While the UI benefits are based on the worker's average earnings during the last six months of employment, the SI benefits are based on an estimate of the earnings a worker would have had during the sickness period.
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between SEK 620 and SEK 19,300 per month.
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This meant that the maximum monthly SI benefits exceeded the maximum monthly UI benefits. The reform on 1 July 2003 changed the marginal replacement rate in the SI in two ways. Figure 2 illustrates how the changes affected unemployed workers. First, the reform reduced the marginal replacement rate to 77.6 percent. This change concerned all insured, employed as well as unemployed. Second, for the unemployed insured, the maximum SI benefits were reduced to SEK 16,060 per month, which corresponded to the maximum monthly UI benefits. The purpose of the latter part of the reform was to prevent unemployed persons from receiving higher benefits by reporting sick.
Before the reform After the reform
Monthly benefits (SEK) Monthly benefits (SEK)
19,300
Figure 2 SI benefits for unemployed workers, before and after the reform in July,
2003
An additional aspect of the second part of the reform, which is important for this study, is that it affected all unemployed insured, i.e. even those with already ongoing UI spells had their SI benefits reduced on 1 July 2003. This feature turns out to be important for the identification strategy (see Section 4). 13 The numbers in this section do not account for the first uncompensated day in a sickness period. Each of the four labor force states is associated with a particular present discounted value of utility. This value depends on the income in the current state as well as on incomes in all other potential states, since chance and choice induce the (homogenous)
workers to move between states. Employed workers face a risk of job loss and nonemployed workers face a chance of finding a job. Workers are also exposed to random (daily) shocks of sickness, which affect their disutility of work and job search. The key decision for employed individuals is to choose between work and sickness absence, and for the non-employed, to choose between search and inactivity, i.e. between unemployment and non-participation.
The optimal behavior is characterized by reservation values of sickness. The employed prefer sickness absence rather than work for sufficiently severe sickness shocks; and similarly, the non-employed prefer non-participation rather than job search for sufficiently serious realizations of sickness. The critical values of sickness generally differ between employed and non-employed workers, and are determined by benefits and other parameters of the model. For example, the reservation value of sickness is higher, the higher is the relative economic gain of being active rather than inactive.
Hence, for non-employed workers, the probability of reporting sick is lower, the lower are SI benefits relative to UI benefits. The reservation level of sickness also depends on differences in transition probabilities; e.g., the higher the relative returns to active job search, the lower the probability that non-employed workers report sick.
A decrease in SI benefits targeting only non-employed workers, such as the one in Sweden in July 2003, has straightforward implications in this framework. First, reduced SI benefits for non-employed individuals will have a direct positive effect on their reservation level of sickness, making non-employed individuals less inclined to report sick. There will also be a wealth effect working in the same direction since the value of non-employment decreases relative to the value of employment, which makes active job search more attractive.
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Second, since the probability of finding a job is higher in unemployment than in non-participation by assumption, the higher reservation level of sickness will also translate into a higher job finding rate among the non-employed workers.
Identification strategy
The question of interest in this paper is whether the reform in July 2003 affected the transition rate to employment, through its effect on the sick report rate. To identify the effect of the reduced SI benefits (relative to the UI benefits), I exploit two features of the reform: (i) As workers became unemployed at different dates, the reform affected them at different durations of unemployment. By exploiting this variation, one can separate the reform effect from the effect of unemployment duration.
(ii) Only those with previous wages above the UI benefit cap were affected by the reform. The change in transitions to employment for those with previously lower wages can thus be used to control for calendar time effects (such as business cycle effects) around the time of the reform, which were common to the two groups.
I begin by describing more closely how the reform affected the difference between UI and SI benefits for various types of unemployed persons.
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Recall that the difference depended on: (i) the wage prior to unemployment, and (ii) whether the person had received UI benefits for less or more than 100 days. Figure 3 shows the case of an unemployed person who has not yet passed the 100-day limit in the UI, i.e. before the UI benefit cap drops.
Day 1-100 on UI benefits
Before the reform After the reform Benefits Benefits Pre-reform SI
SI
Figure 3
The change in SI benefits due to the reform, during the first 100 UI benefit days 16 The following paragraphs in this section build extensively on the description in Section 3 in Larsson and Runeson (2007 The reform lowered the SI benefits for everybody, as the marginal replacement rate was reduced from 80 to 77.6 percent. Thus, SI benefits were reduced relative to UI benefits for all unemployed persons. However, up to the previous wage of SEK 20,696 the reduction in SI benefits was relatively small; amounting to only 3 percent.
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I will refer to this group as the comparison group. For unemployed persons with a previous wage above that cut-off, the treated, the reform implied a reduction of the SI benefits that varied from 3 up to almost 17 percent.
The situation is somewhat different for the unemployed who have passed the first 100 UI benefit days, as the cap in the UI then is lower. This implies that even after the reform, SI benefits are higher than UI benefits for high-wage unemployed persons.
However, the effect of the reform on the difference in SI benefits is similar to Figure 3: up to a previous wage of SEK 20,696 the SI benefits were reduced by 3 percent. From that level upwards, the reduction was larger the higher the previous wage, varying between 3 and almost 17 percent. So again, the population can be divided into treated and comparisons according to the previous wage, the cut-off being at SEK 20,696.
I will analyze the effect of the change in SI compensation on the hazard rate to employment, that is, the rate at which a person finds a job at time t of unemployment, conditional on remaining unemployed up until this point in time. In addition to making use of the treatment and comparison group, the identification strategy used exploits the timing of the reform. The timing feature arises when one uses duration data and has a fixed reform date. As workers be-come unemployed at different dates, the reform affects them at different durations of unemployment. This variation can be used to separate the reform effect from the effect of unemployment duration. I do this by comparing the hazard to employment for people who experienced the reform at different stages of their unemployment period. For example, the unemployed who experienced the reform 8 weeks into their unemployment spell are compared with those whose unemployment spells are at least 8 weeks, but who did not experience the reform until after week 8 or never.
This strategy makes it possible to identify the effect of the reform date. However, it is likely that other changes on the labor market occurred around the time of the reform which also affected transitions to employment. In order to separate the effect of the reduced SI benefits from such factors, I compare the reform-date effect for the treatment and the comparison group. A larger effect for the treated, who experienced a larger benefit cut, will indicate responsiveness to the SI compensation size. The policy change which is used to identify the behavioral response to the SI benefit level is thus not the entire reduction in SI benefits due to the reform, but rather the reduction over and above the general 3 percent reduction in the replacement rate. The effect of the 3 percent reduction cannot be separated from the effects of other changes around the time of the reform.
To estimate the effect of the policy change, I use a Cox regression model. The baseline specification to be estimated can be written as:
where λ 0 is the baseline hazard, i.e. the pre-reform hazard to employment. f(.) is a function of time-invariant covariates, x, and time-varying covariates, z(t), and Ω is a vector of parameters corresponding to the covariates. for SI and thus experienced a benefit increase. However, there are no observations in this income interval in the sample studied in this paper. 18 The covariates included are sex, age, age 2 , immigrant background, marital status, presence of children younger than 18, level of education (4 categories), type of education (10 categories), ln(pre-unemployment wage), number of days left until UI benefit expiration (6 categories), and indicators of the local labor market (county) as well as the month of entry into unemployment.
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The identifying assumption behind this 'difference-in-differences' approach is thus that the development over time of the hazard to employment in the comparison group, captures the counterfactual development in the treatment group, had the reform not occurred. This assumption is violated if, for example, the labor market opportunities developed differently for the two groups around the time of the reform. Divergent trends at other times during the sampling period may also be problematic as they may lead to divergent compositional changes in the two groups regarding unobserved factors.
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In order to check whether the estimates are affected by compositional changes in unobserved factors, I also estimate stratified models. I use the month of entry into unemployment as well as the local labor market as stratification units. This specification should be less sensitive to unobserved heterogeneity as the reform effect is identified solely by comparing individuals beginning their unemployment period during the same month and in the same local labor market. To check whether the results could be biased due to divergent changes in labor market opportunities for the two groups, I try to assess whether such changes have taken place during the relevant time period. I also reestimate the model for a few different sub-samples which are more similar than the treated and comparisons in the baseline model, in terms of the pre-unemployment wage.
Finally, to test whether the results may be biased as a result of divergent seasonal patterns for the two groups, I analyze the effects of a hypothetical reform supposed to have occurred on the same date the year after the actual reform. The results turn out to be robust in these respects.
Data and sampling
5.1 Data I combine data from several different sources for the empirical analysis. The database ASTAT, originating from the unemployment insurance funds, HÄNDEL, from the PES, and the Sickness Benefit Register (SFR) from the National Social Insurance Board, 19 It is well known that problems with unobserved heterogeneity are particularly important to handle when estimating duration models. Contrary to usual regression models, even unobserved heterogeneity which is uncorrelated with the included covariates may cause biased coefficients.
constitute the main sources. These databases are all a part of LINDA, which is a registerbased longitudinal database that includes about 3 percent of the Swedish population.
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LINDA additionally contains several demographic variables collected from e.g. tax registers.
ASTAT contains weekly information on UI benefit payments, as well as on the number of days left until the benefits run out, for all unemployed persons who have received either basic-amount or income-related benefits. It is most common to receive income-related benefits; during 2003 only about 9 percent of all benefit days were on the basic-amount. For those entitled to income-related benefits, the database also includes information on the previous wage.
I use ASTAT as the data source for unemployment spells, which implies that the condition for being defined as unemployed is to receive funding from the UI.
21
Since data on the previous wage does not exist for those who are only entitled to the basicamount of UI benefits, I exclude this group from the sample. Data on the pre-unemployment wage is needed in order to determine a person's SI compensation in case of sickness.
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SFR contains data on sickness spells for all persons who have been entitled to SI benefits. SI benefits can be given on a full or part-time basis, and they can be of a few different types: regular benefits for illness, compensation for work related injury, rehabilitation benefits, and benefits for preventive care. Regular SI benefits for illness are the most common and were paid out during about 89 percent of all SI spells starting in 2003.
I merge ASTAT with SFR in order to track the length of unemployment spells during which the individual switches to SI benefits. Hence, sickness spells that occur during a UI benefit period (at the latest, start the week after the payments from the UI stops) are considered to be a part of the unemployment spell. Naturally, the same spell continues if 20 For a detailed description of LINDA, see Edin and Fredriksson (2000) . 21 This means that participants in labor market programs and individuals who are registered at the PES as unemployed, but who are not qualified for UI benefits, are not included in the sample. 22 Since the income measure on which the SI benefits are actually based only exists for those who have reported sick, I use the income measure reported by the UI funds to calculate the individual's SI compensation in case of sickness. Unless the person worked very irregularly before unemployment, the two income measures should be approximately equal.
the individual later switches back to UI benefits. All types of SI periods are included and, for simplicity, I make no distinction between them.
Neither ASTAT nor SFR contain any information on why the benefits stop, at the end of a spell. Therefore, in order to determine whether or not an unemployment period ends in employment, I use information from HÄNDEL. HÄNDEL consists of data on the individual's labor market status, e.g. unemployed; employed; or participant in a labor market program, and on transitions between such states, for all persons who are registered at the PES. Since registration is compulsory in order to receive UI benefits, the records should include all UI benefit recipients.
I use the individual's registered labor market status the week after the UI (or SI) benefits stop to define whether or not the spell ends in employment. If the worker is still registered in a state pertaining to unemployment during this week, I instead use the labor market transition closest in time after as the reason for benefit interruption, given that the transition occurs within the next four weeks.
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Both permanent and temporary jobs are classified as employment, as long as they cause a break of at least three weeks in the UI benefit payments. An unemployment period is considered to begin when a person who has not received UI benefits during the last three weeks, starts to receive UI benefits. I require that the unemployment spells begin with funding from the UI, i.e. I do not include persons who became unemployed during or directly after a sickness period. 23 The reason for allowing this gap is that ASTAT and HÄNDEL do not match perfectly in this aspect. The discrepancy is most likely due to that there is no flow of information from the UI funds to the employment agencies regarding the individual's benefit payments or labor market status. The information in HÄNDEL is instead given to the employment agency by the individual or his or her employer. 24 A person is defined as employed if, when the benefits stop, he or she has left the register due to permanent or temporary employment (the variable "avaktualiseringsorsak" is equal to 1, 2 or 3), or if he or she is registered as temporarily employed or as job changer (the variable "sökandekategori" is equal to 31 or 41). 25 Before this date, the wage variable is capped for individuals belonging to some of the UI funds.
Each unemployment spell that begins during the sampling period is followed during, at most, 60 weeks or until the end of 2004. The spell length is measured in weeks. An unemployment period ends when there is a break in the UI payments, other than due to sickness, which is three weeks or longer. That is, very short intervening employment periods or other breaks are treated as part of the unemployment period. If a UI period ends for some other reason than employment, e.g. because the person starts an education; a labor market program (including subsidized employment programs); or if the reason is unknown, the spell is treated as censored.
Quite a large share of the unemployment spells, almost 15 percent, end for unknown reasons; either the PES has registered that they have lost contact with the person, or the data contains no reason for the UI benefit interruption 26 . It is likely that some of these spells end in employment. People who have found a job may not see any reason to contact the PES. If the job is short term only, such persons are likely to remain registered as unemployed during the subsequent employment period, and hence I do not observe any reason for the UI benefit interruption in the data. If the job is long-term, the PES will at some point report that they have lost contact with the person. 27 To the extent that the fraction of spells ending for unknown reasons that actually end in employment differ systematically between unemployment spells that include sickness spells and those that do not, this may bias the estimate of the reform effect. To check whether the results are sensitive to how these spells are treated, I have re-estimated the model treating all spells ending for unknown reasons as ending in employment. As it turns out, this does not affect my findings.
This sampling procedure results in a sample of 19,291 unemployment spells.
However, almost 12 percent are excluded since the person cannot be found in the HÄN-DEL registers during the relevant time period, or due to inconsistent information in HÄNDEL. I also exclude workers older than 60 and workers with reported work related disabilities. Finally, I exclude a few spells where the worker's previous wage is below the limit for SI eligibility. The resulting sample contains 11,022 unemployed persons and 14,935 unemployment spells. About 24 percent of the individuals have multiple unemployment spells. Table 1 gives statistics on the duration of the unemployment spells as well as on the reason for benefit interruption. We see that the average spell length is about two weeks longer for the treated than for the comparisons. This could be due to that it is more common among those in the comparison group to have breaks of a few weeks in their unemployment periods. Recall that an unemployment spell -as defined here -ends if there is a break in the benefit payments that is three weeks or longer. Since repeated unemployment is more common among the comparisons, this group in general has fewer days left until their UI benefits expire in the beginning of their unemployment spells. The proportion of spells ending in employment also differs between the groups; while 35 percent end in employment for the treated, this share is only 21 percent for the comparisons. Compared to previous Swedish studies on unemployment duration, these shares appear low; e.g. in Carling et al (2001) the proportion of spells ending in employment is nearly 47 percent. There are a couple of reasons for why this share is much lower in my sample: I censor spells at an earlier duration of unemployment; the proportion of spells ending for unknown reasons (which could be employment) is much higher; and I am more likely to observe breaks in the unemployment spells in my data, compared to in the data used in previous studies.
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The most common reason for benefit interruption in the comparison group is 'other destinations'; 42 percent of the spells end in this category, compared to 22 percent among the treated. Other destinations include e.g. education and part time unemployment (without UI benefits). Among these, the latter is the most common destination in the comparison group. 28 Most previous Swedish studies have used HÄNDEL to measure unemployment duration. This data is less appropriate here, since there is no consistent way of handling individuals who transfer to SI benefits in this register. Short sickness spells are likely to be unnoticed in HÄNDEL, whereas a person who gets SI benefits for a longer time period either leaves the register at some point during the sickness period, or is moved to the category 'others registered'. The PES generally has less frequent contact with individuals in this category, which means that the information on unemployment duration is likely to be less accurate also for these individuals. From Table 2 which presents descriptive covariate statistics, we can see that the unemployed in the comparison group, on average, are younger, less educated, and have more young children compared to the treated. The proportion of women is also higher in this group, as is the proportion of immigrants from non-OECD countries. There are also some differences in type of education between the two groups. The differences in observed characteristics are a natural consequence of having defined treatment status based on the pre-unemployment wage.
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IFAU -Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? Here, we see a first indication of how the reform affected sickness absence and job finding among unemployed workers. The sick report rate is higher for the comparison group for most of the time period. Around the time of the reform it decreases for both groups, a pattern which is in line with a common finding in the Swedish literature on sickness insurance, namely that sick report rates tend to decline in the summer (see e.g. Larsson 2006, and Johansson and Palme 2005) . After the summer, the flow to SI benefits returns almost to the pre-reform level for the comparisons group, while it remains on a somewhat lower level for the treated. This pattern is thus consistent with the reform having a negative effect on sickness absence among those unemployed who were affected by the reform, as is found by Larsson and Runeson (2007) . Regarding the job finding rate on the other hand, there is no indication that transitions to employment IFAU -Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? 21 increased for the treated relative to the comparisons after the reform. When interpreting these figures it is important to note that they do not adjust for any of the potentially important differences between the two groups. Perhaps most importantly, they do not account for the lengths of the unemployment spells.
29
Separating the reform effect from the effect of unemployment duration is a crucial part of the identification strategy, which we turn to next.
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Share reporting sick 29 Not accounting for spell length means that the composition of the two groups with regard to unemployment duration will change over time in divergent ways, since the workers in the different groups leave unemployment at different rates. This may cause the difference between the hazard rate for the treated and the comparisons to change over time.
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IFAU -Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? 30 The most important difference is that I use weekly, rather than daily, data. 31 Since I allow individuals to return to UI benefits after a sickness period, I here follow Larsson and Runeson (2007) and exclude UI spells starting after July 1, 2003. This is to avoid changes in the sample composition that are caused by the reform. If the reform also affects the duration of the SI spells, it may affect the composition of UI recipients through its effect on the hazard rate from SI back to UI. 32 In this analysis, I do not impose the restriction that there must be a three-week break in the UI benefit payments for a spell to end. Instead, a sickness period of any length or an interruption in the UI benefit payments which is longer than one calendar week defines the end of a UI period. estimated reform effect for four different specifications, estimated with partial maximum likelihood 33 . A table with all parameter estimates can be found in the Appendix.
Column (1) shows the results for a model that only includes a dummy for the reform date, a dummy for treatment status, and an interaction variable called the 'cap reform effect'. The latter captures the effect of the reduced SI benefit cap, and is thus the variable of interest. In column (2) I present results for a model to which I have added indicators for the month of entry into unemployment, the number of days left until the UI benefits expire, the local labor market, as well the following individual characteristics: sex, age, level of education (4 categories), type of education (10 categories), immigrant background, marital status, presence of children younger than 18 and pre-unemployment wage. The last two columns show results for two stratified models, where the month of entry into unemployment and the local labor market are used as stratification units.
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As mentioned in Section 4, these models should be less sensitive to compositional changes in unobserved factors as the reform effect is identified solely by comparing individuals beginning their unemployment period during the same month (column 3), as well as in the same local labor market (column 4).
We first note that the coefficient for the reform date dummy is negative and significant in all four specifications, indicating that there was a general decrease in sickness absence around the time of the reform. This variable should partially be picking up the effect of the general 3 percent reduction in SI benefits but also the effect of other changes around July 1, 2003, such as seasonal variation in sickness absence.
The estimate for the 'cap reform effect' is also statistically significant in all specifications and quite large; it suggests that the reduced SI benefit cap lowered the incidence of sick reports among the treated with 31-33 percent 35 . Moreover, this estimate is very stable across the various specifications. Hence, in line with Larsson and Runeson 33 Ties are handled using the exact method in SAS, see DeLong et al (1994) , and Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) . 34 These models are estimated with a stratified partial maximum likelihood estimator; see e.g. van den Berg (2001), section 6. 35 The percentage effect is obtained by 100*(exp(β)-1), where β is the parameter of interest.
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(2007), these results suggest that the reform had a strong negative effect on the transition rate to SI among the UI recipients.
36 Table 3 Estimated effects on the transition rate to sickness insurance Note: Estimation using (stratified) partial maximum likelihood estimator. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent levels respectively. (t) denotes time-varying variable. The following covariates are included in column (2)-(4): sex, age, age 2 , immigrant background, marital status, presence of children younger than 18, level of education, type of education, ln(pre-unemployment wage), and indicators for the local labor market.
6.2
Transitions to employment Let us now move on to analyze whether the reduced sick report rate among the treated also translated into a higher rate of job finding. The results for the Cox regression models are reported in Table 4 . As in the previous section, I start by presenting results for a model that only includes a dummy for the reform date, a dummy for the treatment group and an interaction variable -the 'cap reform effect' -which captures the effect of the reduced SI benefit cap on the treated population (column 1). The point estimate for the cap reform effect is close to zero in this model and it is not statistically significant.
Adding covariates to the model does not alter this finding; the estimate for the cap reform effect is close to zero and non-significant also in the second specification, which includes all covariates. A table with all parameter estimates can be found in the Appendix.
In the last two specifications, I have stratified on the month of inflow into unemployment (column 3), as well as on the local labor market (column 4). This means that the baseline hazard is allowed to differ across months of entry, and across local labor markets. The variation which identifies the reform effect in these specifications thus comes from when, within a given month, a person entered unemployment. These models should be less sensitive to seasonal (column 3), as well as regional (column 4), variations in labor market conditions. A further implication of this approach is that only unemployment spells that start before the reform are used to identify the reform effect (since there is no within-month variation in the time-varying reform variable for spells beginning after the reform). While the estimate for the cap reform effect does not change much as I stratify on the entry month, it becomes more negative when I also stratify on the local labor market. However, it is still very far from being significantly different from zero. In sum, I find no evidence suggesting that the reduced sick report rate in the treatment group affected the transition rate to employment.
Regarding the other variables, we note that the estimate for the post reform dummy is negative and significant in all four specifications. This result indicates a general decrease in transitions to employment around the time of the reform (as is suggested in Figure 5 ). We also note that the dummy for the treatment group is positive and significant, showing that the job finding rate in general is higher for the unemployed with previously high wages.
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IFAU -Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? Even in the absence of a significant average treatment effect, there may be an effect on the job finding rate for sub-groups of unemployed workers. Previous studies on sickness absence among the unemployed, find that the flow to SI increases as the UI expiration date approaches (see e.g. Larsson 2006) . A similar pattern is visible in my results, see Table A1 in the Appendix. Moreover, Larsson and Runeson (2007) find that the decline in sick reports due to the July 2003-reform was largest among those with relatively few UI days left. To check whether there perhaps is an effect on the job finding rate for those who are close to benefit expiration, I have re-estimated the model only including the sub-sample with less than 150 remaining UI days (in the beginning of their unemployment period). However, the estimate for the cap reform effect is insignificant also for this group.
6.3
Sensitivity analyses The treatment and comparison group are indeed heterogeneous in several respects as treatment status is defined based on pre-unemployment earnings. One concern is whether the estimate of the cap reform effect is biased due to divergent trends in labor market opportunities for the two groups. Figure   6 gives no support for that these opportunities worsened for the treated relative to the controls; it rather suggests the reverse. The employment-to-population rates are only available as annual averages. As discussed above, the result could also be biased due to divergent seasonal patterns in labor market opportunities for workers with different wages. In order to examine this possibility, I first re-estimate the model for different sub-samples which are more 28 IFAU -Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? similar than the treated and comparisons in the baseline model, in terms of the preunemployment wage. I also test whether there could be different seasonal patterns for the two groups around the time of the reform, by analyzing the effects of a hypothetical reform supposed to have occurred on the same date the year after the actual reform.
37
To reduce heterogeneity between the two groups, I successively exclude individuals with the 10 percent, 30 percent, 50 percent and 70 percent lowest pre-unemployment wages in the comparison group.
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Column (2)- (5) in Table 4 ). The point estimate for the cap reform effect remains close to zero in all these regressions and the estimate is far from being statistically significant. Hence, limiting heterogeneity between the two groups in this way does not affect my findings. (pre-unemployment wage) , number of days until UI-expiration, indicators for the month of entry into unemployment and the local labor market. 37 Due to lack of data on pre-unemployment wages for 2002, I cannot perform the same analysis for the year before the reform. 38 Ideally, we may also want to exclude individuals with the highest previous wages among the treated. However, by doing this we would at the same time reduce the average amount of 'treatment' received in the treatment group. Recall that the percentage decrease in SI benefits varied among the treated depending on the pre-unemployment wage; the higher the wage, the larger the percentage reduction in benefits. The results from such an exercise would thus be difficult to interpret.
To study the effect of a hypothetical reform the year after the actual reform, I construct a new sample of unemployment spells, following the same sampling procedure but instead including spells beginning during the period 1 December 2003 -30 December 2004. In case this imaginary reform gives rise to a significant estimate for the 'cap reform effect', this would indicate that the seasonal patterns may indeed differ for the two groups around this time of the year. If there is no significant 'effect' of the hypothetical reform either, divergent seasonal patterns in labor market opportunities seems less likely to be a problem. The results for this exercise are shown in Table 6 , column (2).
The first column of the table reproduces my main results for the actual reform (shown in column 2, Table 4 ). The estimate for the hypothetical cap reform is more negative than the estimate for the actual reform, however it is far from being significantly different from zero. Hence, there is no evidence of different seasonal patterns for the two groups around July 1 the year after the reform. In addition to the sensitivity analyses presented above, I have checked whether the results are sensitive to how unemployment spells that end for 'unknown reasons' (which may well be employment) are treated. To do this, I have re-estimated the model treating these spell as ending in employment. I have also estimated a model that account for (persistent) unobserved individual heterogeneity, by using the fact that I have multiple 30 IFAU -Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? unemployment spells for a part of the sample.
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The findings are qualitatively the same in these models.
Concluding remarks
This paper studies the effects of a reform which substantially reduced the economic incentives for unemployed persons to transfer from the unemployment insurance (UI) to the sickness insurance (SI). While there is evidence that this reform effectively lowered the incidence of sick reports among the unemployed affected, I find no evidence suggesting that the reduced sick report rate in turn affected the transition rate to employment. Hence, for those who reduced their sick report rate due to the reform, spending more time in the UI rather than the SI did not seem to shorten the time out of employment.
Should we then conclude that the interplay between these two insurances does not have any economic significance, and that it does not matter whether there perhaps is excess use of the SI among the unemployed? Probably not. First of all, making sure that the insurance systems are used in the way intended is likely to be important per se. If the citizens have the perception that the benefits are misused this could undermine the legitimacy for the social insurance system. Second, we should note that the study in this paper is a partial equilibrium analysis, and that the results do not indicate how the reform affected total employment. Reduced SI benefits for the unemployed may affect employment through other channels than the one studied here, e.g. it may affect transitions to other benefit systems as they become relatively more attractive. Early retirement pension is one example.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the fact that I do not find any effect on the job finding rate can have two different explanations, which in turn will have very different 39 To check whether the results are affected by compositional changes in unobserved factors, I have estimated a model where I stratify on the individual. That is, the reform effect is identified using within individual variation. This method may not be ideal since it only uses a small sub-sample of the unemployed workers (only 24 percent of the individuals in the sample have repeated unemployment spells), as well as rests on the assumption that the unobserved individual characteristics are fixed across spells. However, the results are qualitatively the same. These results are not reported, but are available upon request from the author.
policy implications. First, it could be due to that, for those affected by the reform, search effort did not differ depending on receiving benefits from the UI or the SI (given their health status). This would then indicate that monitoring in at least one of the insurance systems is insufficient. If these unemployed persons did not search actively in either system, this would suggest insufficient monitoring in the UI, as active search is a formal requirement for receiving UI benefits. If they in fact searched actively in both systems, this would instead indicate insufficient monitoring in the SI, as the SI is intended for those who have lost their work (search) capacity due to sickness.
Second, it is possible that spending more time in the UI in fact did increase search effort, but that more active search still did not result in faster transitions to employment for this particular group. If this is the case, it would indicate that those who changed their sickness absence behavior due to the reform belong to a group with weak attachment to the labor market. An interesting topic for future research would be to use data on individual search behavior in order to discriminate between these two explanations. Note: Estimation using (stratified) partial maximum likelihood estimator. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent levels respectively. (t) denotes time-varying variable.Measured in the beginning of the unemployment spell.
36 IFAU -Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? Note: Estimation using (stratified) partial maximum likelihood estimator. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent levels respectively. (t) denotes time-varying variable.  Measured in the beginning of the unemployment spell.
